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CASH RENT LEASES BY MARITAL TRUSTS
— by Neil E. Harl*
Where special use valuation has been elected,1 a
question since publication of regulations in 19802 has been
whether cash rent leasing in the post-death period triggered
recapture of special use valuation benefits.3  The cases4 and
the rulings5
 
have been in agreement that a cash rent lease6
or a "net lease"7 led to recapture of special use valuation
benefits after the two-year "grace" period immediately after
death.8 Because cash rent leases in the pre-death period
have been permitted (for purposes of special use valuation
eligibility) if to a member of the family of the decedent-to-
be,9 the two-year grace period was created to allow time for
pre-death cash rent leases to be renegotiated to crop share
leases or other arrangements after death.
Amendment in 1988
Although no cash rent leasing was allowed in the post
death period after publication of the regulations in 1980,10
an amendment in 1988 allowed a surviving spouse who
inherited qualified real property to lease the land on a "net
cash basis" to a member of the spouse's family without
causing recapture."11 The provision added in 1988 was
made retroactive to 1977.
It is clear from the 1988 amendment that cash rent leases
by the surviving spouse to a member of the surviving
spouse's family are acceptable and do not result in recapture
of the special use valuation benefits obtained earlier on the
land.12  The situation becomes more complex if the land is
left in trust for the surviving spouse in a marital and non-
marital share arrangement or is left in a legal life estate for
the surviving spouse with the remainder interest left to
children or other qualified heirs.
In a 1990 private letter ruling,13 land was left in a
marital trust for the surviving spouse and in a non-marital
trust with the trustee having discretion to distribute income
to the spouse and to the decedent's issue during the spouse's
life.  The land in both trusts was cash rented to a member of
the surviving spouse's family.
The ruling held that the cash rent lease by the marital
trust was not a disposition leading to recapture.  The
surviving spouse held the entire interest in the income and
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the principal, as is required for the marital deduction.14  To
be eligible for the marital deduction, the interest passing to
the surviving spouse must not be terminable by the passage
of time, the occurrence of a contingency or the failure of a
contingency to occur except for the special election to treat
life estates as eligible for the marital deduction.15
As for the non-marital trust, the cash rent lease
constituted a recapture disposition inasmuch as the spouse
was not the sole beneficiary.16  The trustee's "sprinkling"
power to distribute income to the surviving spouse and the
decedent's issue during the spouse's life was sufficient to
make the 1988 amendment inapplicable.17 Technically, it
was not a cash rent lease by the surviving spouse to a
member of the surviving spouse's family.  Therefore, the
cash rental arrangement was evaluated under the law
applicable to qualified heirs generally with the result that it
was a cessation of qualified use.18
In another 1990 private letter ruling,19 a similar situation
was involved.  Land had been left in a marital trust for the
surviving spouse and a non-marital trust.  Under the non-
marital trust, the surviving spouse had a life estate.  The
trustee had the right to make discretionary principal
distributions to others.  Land in both trusts was cash rented
to a member of the surviving spouse's family.
The cash rent lease by the marital trust posed no
problem.  Again, the surviving  spouse had to be given the
rights to income and control over the principal in order for
the marital deduction to be available.20
The problem was with the non-marital trust.  The ruling,
however, approved the cash rent lease by the non-marital
trust because the cash rent lease was set to terminate at the
death of the surviving spouse or, if discretionary
distributions were made, during the spouse's lifetime.21
This provision in the lease saved the land in the non-marital
trust from recapture.  It should be noted, however, that
providing for the termination of a cash rent lease at the
spouse's death or upon the occurrence of discretionary
distributions of principal can cause problems of a different
sort.22  Indeed, several states have provided statutorily for
continuation of leases beyond the death of the life tenant-
lessor because of the practical problems of lease termination
during the lease year.23
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A better solution may be to utilize a crop share lease,
rather than a cash rent lease.  Crop share leases meet the
qualified use test in the post-death period.24
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1994
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
394, (the Act) made several important changes to the
Bankruptcy Code. The Act expressly waives the
governmental immunity for money judgments against the
IRS for violation of the automatic stay and other provisions.
However, the Act limits the amount of attorney’s fees
recoverable to $75 per hour unless special expertise was
required and prohibits awards of punitive damages.
The Act also limits the actions which constitute a
violation of the automatic stay, excluding tax audits,
assessments, demands for tax returns and issuing of notices
and demands for payment of assessments.
The Act extends the period for governmental entities to
file claims after the first creditors’ meeting to 180 days but
expressly provides that late filed claims may be disallowed.
The Act increases the debt limit for Chapter 13
eligibility to $250,000 of unsecured debt and $750,000 of
secured debt.
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ATTORNEY’S FEES. The debtors filed for Chapter 11
and because they could not afford to give their bankruptcy
attorney a retainer, the attorney took a second mortgage on
the debtors’ farm. The fair market value of the farm was
sufficient to cover the other secured debt. The trustee
objected to the second mortgage as disqualifying the
attorney under Section 327(a). The court, sitting en banc,
held that the attorney’s second mortgage gave the attorney
an adverse interest in the estate sufficient to disqualify the
attorney. In re Escalera, 171 B.R. 107 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.
1994).
CONSOLIDATION. The debtors, husband and wife,
owed a corporation which operated a horse breeding ranch.
The husband had made a personal guarantee of a
corporation loan to purchase a horse and had listed the farm
as the husband’s asset, even thought he farm was owned
solely by the wife. The court found that the creditor had not
relied on the farm in making the loan because no check was
made as to actual ownership and the farm was not taken as
security for the loan. The debtors filed a joint Chapter 11
petition, listing all of their assets on one schedule. The cases
were also jointly administered. The creditor sought to have
the cases declared substantively consolidated, subjecting the
wife’s farm to the husband’s guarantee, because the assets
of the debtors were commingled and the cases were jointly
administered. The appellate court reversed the order for
consolidation, holding that the joint administration of cases
was insufficient to make them consolidated and that the
wife’s assets and proceeds of assets were sufficiently
identifiable to be subject only to her debts. The court also
held that, because the creditor did not rely on the farm as
security for the loan and did not attempt to clarify
ownership of the farm before making the loan, the equities
favored not subjecting the wife’s farm to the husband’s
guarantee. In re Reider, 31 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 1994).
SALES TAXES. The debtors were the owners of a
corporation which operated a pizza restaurant which owed
the state for sales taxes collected but not paid. The debtors
were personally liable for the corporation’s sales taxes. The
debtors argued that the sales taxes were a form of excise tax
dischargeable under Sections 523(a)(1)(A), 507(a)(7)(E).
The court held that because the debtors were personally
liable for the taxes, the sales taxes were a trust fund type of
tax under Section 507(a)(7)(C) and nondischargeable. In re
Kelley, 171 B.R. 113 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
